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STATE AND LAW IN YOUNG MARX: EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL 
ELEMENTS FROM A POST-MARXIST APPROACH 
 
ESTADO Y DERECHO EN EL JOVEN MARX: ELEMENTOS EPISTEMOLÓGICOS 
Y TEÓRICOS DESDE UN ENFOQUE POSMARXISTA 
 
ESTADO E DIREITO NO JOVEM MARX: ELEMENTOS EPISTEMOLÓGICOS E 
TEÓRICOS A PARTIR DE UMA ABORDAGEM PÓS-MARXISTA 
 




This paper seeks to identify some epistemological and theoretical paths in young Marx´s 
writings about law, in order to suggest a critique of current state and law from a post-Marxist 
view. First, the paper argues that young Marx draws the basis for a materialist and political 
critique of law against idealistic and dogmatic approaches. Second, the bourgeois opposition 
between unreal generality and real individuality -identified by the young Marx – allows us to 
analyse law as a juridical form rather than a utopian or essential content of the social. Finally, 
the young Marxian distinction between political emancipation and human emancipation leads 
us to think, on the one hand, about the juridical institution of the liberal individual – as isolated 
monads – and, on the other hand, about the intimate relationship between law and its 
transgression. 
 





Este artículo busca identificar algunos elementos epistemológicos y teóricos en los escritos del 
joven Marx sobre el derecho, con el fin de sugerir una crítica del estado y el derecho actuales 
desde una visión posmarxista. Primero, se sostiene que el joven Marx sienta las bases para una 
crítica materialista y política del derecho contra los enfoques idealistas y dogmáticos. En 
segundo lugar, la oposición burguesa entre generalidad irreal e individualidad real -identificada 
por el joven Marx- nos permite analizar el derecho como forma jurídica más que como 
contenido utópico o esencial de lo social. Finalmente, la distinción del joven Marx entre 
emancipación política y emancipación humana nos lleva a pensar, por un lado, en la institución 
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jurídica del individuo liberal -como mónadas aisladas- y, por otro, en la íntima relación entre 
el derecho y su transgresión. 
 






Este artigo busca identificar alguns elementos epistemológicos e teóricos nos escritos do jovem 
Marx sobre o direito, a fim de sugerir uma crítica ao estado e ao direito atual a partir de uma 
perspectiva pós-marxista. Em primeiro lugar, considera-se que o jovem Marx estabelece as 
bases para uma crítica materialista e política do direito contra as abordagens idealistas e 
dogmáticas. Em segundo lugar, a oposição burguesa entre generalidade irreal e individualidade 
real - identificada pelo jovem Marx - permite-nos analisar o direito como uma forma jurídica e 
não como um conteúdo utópico ou essencial do social. Por fim, a distinção do jovem Marx entre 
emancipação política e emancipação humana leva-nos a pensar, por um lado, na instituição 
jurídica do indivíduo liberal - como mônadas isoladas - e, por outro, na íntima relação entre o 
direito e sua transgressão. 
 






1. INTRODUCTION: A POST-MARXIST APPROACH TO THE YOUNG MARX 
 
This paper seeks to identify some epistemological and theoretical elements of a 
contemporary critique of law, based on the analysis of state and law provided in the works of 
the young Marx. As Donald Kelley puts it, “too little attention has been paid to the profession 
first chosen by Marx, namely, that of the law” (1978: 350). However, jurisprudence was an 
early focus of Marx studies and also “a system of thought that continued to possess at least a 
negative importance” for him (KELLEY, 1978: 367). Against the traditional liberal view of law 
as a guardian of the “Common good”, Marx’s subversion2 of jurisprudence targeted “a 
comprehensive secular religion and a paradigm of idealist social thought, in a pejorative sense 
of "ideology” (KELLEY, 1978: 367). 
First and foremost, it is necessary to explicitly state the theoretical assumptions that 
underly my analysis in this paper. The post-Marxist and Lacanian viewpoint implies certain 
 
2 For Kelley “Marx's first act of academic subversion was to turn Savigny, not Hegel, on his head” (1978: 358). 
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epistemological and theoretical foundations that necessarily informs this paper and the focus of 
the young Marx3. The purpose of this paper is not to trace the elements of continuity or 
discontinuity between the early and the later Marx´s works. Louis Althusser, the main advocate 
of the periodization thesis, focuses on the theoretical unity of Marx work. For Althusser the 
epistemological break occurs in 1845 when from philosophical anthropologism, focused on the 
essence of man and human nature, Marx´s work moves to historical materialism, a scientific 
viewpoint (LEOGRANDE, 1977). Furthermore, Althusser highlights Capital as Marx’s main 
scientific work:  
 
To rely exclusively on the Breakup Works or only on the arguments of the 
subsequent ideological struggle is practically equivalent to falling into the 
"blunder" of not understanding that the place par excellence where we are allowed 
to read Marx's philosophy in person is his great work: Capital (ALTHUSSER, 
2006: 36).  
 
In a similar vein, Nicos Poulantzas affirms,  
 
in his youthful works, Marx will systematically deal with the problems referred 
to the legal field and yet, nothing can be deduced in reference to any scientific 
basis of the Marxist theory of law (1986: 112). 
 
But other authors like Umberto Cerroni have highlighted the young Marx´s writings as 
a way of avoiding extremely reductionists approaches to Marx, which has “blocked for many 
years the critique of politics and law that had been promised by Marx and that he had not given” 
(1980: 22). Even Jaime Escamilla Hernández goes as far as to say, “fortunately, today, the 
ravages of conceiving the theory of historical materialism as a finished set are well known” 
(1991: 27). At this conjecture, the basis of this chapter is the epistemological consideration of 
the impossible unity of any work, including the one of Marx. The post-Marxist viewpoint of 
this paper implies the acknowledgement of the premise that there is no metalanguage, in the 
sense that the access to a complete language or metalanguage is impossible, whether it is 
juridical or any other (LACLAU, 2000; STAVRAKAKIS, 2007). Consequently, if a plenary 
language is not possible, no theoretical work will be.  
 
3This research line refers to post-Marxist approaches to law and state from the political discourse theory (among 
others: GLYNOS & HOWARTH, 2007; FOA TORRES, 2017a) and the articulation between psychoanalysis, law 
and political theory (among other: FOA TORRES, 2013, 2016). 
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Second, the aim is not to argue that the young Marx is a “bourgeois Marx” (among 
others: LUKACS, 1971; DUSSEL, 1993; BERMUDO ÁVILA, 1975) or discover all over the 
German ideology that is still present in Marx (Lowy, 1973). For Enrique Dussel, Marx´s youth 
is an anti-idealist philosophical phase rather than the political revolutionary that he was at the 
definitive phase of his thought (1993). George Lukacs notes that the young Marx is an idealistic 
one (1971). Once again, a much less ambitious goal in this chapter is to recover some 
epistemological elements of young Marx’s writings related to law and state, especially 
considering that a political pragmatic interpretation of Marx´s work is the main one in the field 
of law, which reduces it to a simple instrument of class neglecting its normative specificity as 
well as its relationship with economic structures. 
Thirdly, the focuse of a post-Marxist approach – as Yannis Stavrakakis pointed out - is 
not to build an approach that could release itself from all theoretical reduction: "Even the most 
objective (casual) reading of a text, the simplest analysis of a question, are contaminated by 
certain reductionism" (2007: 14). Consequently, the point is not the assumption of an absolute 
or rightful position: “To create a distance from the crude reduction, it is necessary to operate 
within the field of reduction; it is necessary to reduce the reduction to its own impossibility" 
(STAVRAKAKIS, 2007: 14). Accordingly, facing Marx´s work the question is what type of 
reduction of Marx’s works we do and not do to avoid any reduction. Our reduction is to take 
some elements of the young Marx liable to enlighten some currently key issues for critical legal 
studies: the critique of juridical and philosophical dogmatism, the study of law as a form and 
the relationship between state and emancipation in the capitalist mode of production.  
Fourthly, the study of the young Marx is not necessarily to “exalt Marx as a person with 
uniquely humanist vision” (HAMMEN, 1970: 120). From this point of view, the young Marx´s 
humanism relies in the basis of a “human essence” that “is the true communitarian essence of 
men” (2008e: 131). The problem of human alienation in the capitalist mode of production is 
central for this essentialist conception. However, for some authors like Donald Hodges (1966) 
the concern about humanity/alienation is a weak substitute for the economic criticism of 
bourgeois society. Nevertheless, if we state that there is not a full language, we can assert that 
there is no correct interpretation of Marx´s work. There are only interpretations –in plural- that 
could focus on the law function in the humanity alienation under the capitalist mode of 
production without overlooking the economic structure. Furthermore, from a post-Marxist view 
the concern about human alienation could be a possibility to radicalize Marxist thought. The 
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concern about human essence is not necessarily an exercise of a bourgeois doctrine (HODGES, 
1966) henceforth there is no pure bourgeois or even pure proletarian doctrine possible. In this 
sense, for a post-Marxist view we can only access the hybrid and failed theorizations 
In short, a post-Marxist approach is possible as long as we agree that a legitimate way 
to be Marxist is following the Lacanian maxim: “you can dispense it [The Name of the Father] 
with the condition of using it” (LACAN, 2006: 133), or in our terms ´you can dispense Marx 
with the condition of using Marx´. In this sense, post-Marxism is not an anti-Marxism but an 
attempt to radicalize Marx’s work. In this sense, from certain critiques of young Marx will be 
drawn some epistemological and theoretical elements. First, the chapter argues that in Marx´s 
earlier writings relies the basis for a materialist and political critique of law against idealistic 
and dogmatic approaches. Second, from the bourgeois opposition between unreal generality 
and real individuality -identified by the young Marx- will be drawn the analysis of law as a 
juridical form rather than a utopian or essential content of the social. Finally, the young-
Marxian distinction between political emancipation and human emancipation leads us to think, 
on the one hand, about the juridical institution of the liberal individual –as isolated monads- 
and, on the other hand, about the intimate relationship between law and its transgression 
Finally, the focus will be on those writings that, as Rubén Jaramillo points out, “bring together 
the basic elements of the critique of Marx of bourgeois state and law” (2008: 37). That is to say 
the “Jewish Question” (1843), “Critique to Hegel’s philosophy of law” (1843) and also “Letter 
to father” (1842), “Letters to Arnold Ruge” (1843), “Comments on The Latest Prussian 
Censorship Instruction” (1843), “Moralising Criticism and Critical Morality” (1844) and 
“Critical notes on the article 'The king of Prussia and social reform” (1844).  
 
2. AGAINST THE METAPHYSICS OF LAW: THE MATERIALISTIC CRITIQUE 
OF LAW 
 
Before the end of his jurisprudential studies, Marx wrote a letter to his father (1842) 
describinig his thesis as an “unhappy work”. Even though this thesis has never been found, 
Marx develops some interesting topics in that letter. Jean Hyppolite has even said “It is very 
difficult within the short space of an essay to show how Marx fulfilled the program he had 
outlined in this first letter” (1973: 95). Donald Kelley points out that if the thesis itself was not 
unconventional what was unconventional was “Marx´s reaction to his own work, and he laid 
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bare its deficiencies in his usual intemperate language” (1978: 354). Marx´s father himself 
warned him about the consequences of the radical critique to the juridical field: "Your views 
on law are not without truth (…) but are very likely to arouse storms if made into a system, and 
are you not aware how violent storms are among the learned?" (Cited in: KELLEY, 1973: 355). 
The letter shows that Marx´s studies of law were oriented by “the impulse to undertake them 
with philosophy” (Marx, 2008a: 43). The developments of jurisprudence or juridical science 
are insufficient to study the law from a critical perspective. Here, the young Marx´s desire to 
go beyond the “metaphysics of law” is evidenced. The metaphysics of law implies “principles, 
reflections, definitions separated from all the real rights and of every real form of law” (2008a: 
43). In line with this, the critique to the idealist opposition between the real and the “ought to 
be” –characteristic of jurisprudence- is the first and foundational step of Marx´s position facing 
the world of law. 
A few years later Marx outlined his critique of the German historical school of law –
specifically to of Gustav Hugo and Friedrich von Savigny- and to Hegel´s philosophy of law 
and state as manifestations of the metaphysics of law. For the young Marx, both represented 
forms of ideology – in a pejorative sense – rather than scientific or philosophical approaches 
(Kelley, 1973).  Marx opposes the “mathematical dogmatism” with the “living world” to 
specify the criticism of metaphysical theoretical positions4:  
 
The triangle allows the mathematician to construct and prove that it remains pure 
representation in space, that something new is not developed; it must be placed 
next to other things and then it will take a different position and this different thing 
that is added to it gives different relationships and truths to it. On the contrary, in 
the concrete expression of the living world of thought, as it is Law, State, nature, 
as it is all philosophy, the object itself must be spied on, it must be stalked; 
arbitrary classifications should not be imposed from outside, the reason for the 
thing itself should continue to roll as something in conflict with itself and find 
itself its unit (2008a: 43).  
 
In this early intervention, Marx situates the Law in the “living world” where the objects 
are not completely capturable as in the field of pure mathematics. Therefore, the criticism 
should avoid any voluntarism and any classifications speculatively imposed.  
We can also find young Marx´s anti dogmatic position  in his “Letters to Arnold Ruge”: 
“our motto must be:  attaining consciousness, not by dogmas but by means of the analysis of 
the mystical consciousness, obscure to itself, whether it is presented in a religious or in a 
 
4 Jean Hyppolite points out that Marx takes from the Hegel´s Preface to the Phenomenology in which he “contrasts 
the mathematician's method with the philosopher's dialectic” (1973: 94). 
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political way” (MARX, 2008c: 91). Marx argues for a new orientation of the philosophical 
critique that avoids the “dogmatic anticipation of the world” of philosophers, which intend to 
get “the solution to every enigma”. From metaphysics of law and speculative philosophy “to 
look for the reality itself” (2008a: 46), the main concern for the young Marx emerges here in 
the conception of philosophy as a mediation between form and content, the object and the idea. 
As Umberto Cerroni pointed out, the method for a construction of a scientific abstraction is “the 
development of thought according to the specific object, to prevent that it figures as reality 
without form or like idea” (1965: 101). 
In his “Critique to Hegel´s philosophy of law”, Marx specifies a conception of criticism 
that struggles against philosophical idealism (specifically Hegelian), religion and thus “that 
world whose spiritual smell is the religion” (2008d: 95). The first step of every criticism, and 
specially the critique of law, is to bring into question the state of affairs as a social construction 
rather than a gift of God: “Men make religions, religion does not make men” (2008d: 95). Then, 
Marx can state the empty entity of human essence: “[religion] is the fantastic realization of 
human essence, because the human essence does not have true reality” (2008d: 95).  
At least two consequences can be drawn from that statement. First, in those early 
writings Marx starts to draw a method of critique of ideology that relies on a materialistic 
analysis. The main characteristic of juridical dogmatism and philosophical idealism is not its 
isolated nature -isolated from the real world-rather than all its empirical assumptions. As 
Galvano Della Volpe puts it “the problem is not the emptiness of apriorism but the empirical 
contents that lie behind apriorisms” (1975: 128). Therefore, to avoid the metaphysics of law it 
is necessary to build a materialist critique of law that addresses the research to the material 
structure of society. The ´idea of the social´ must be replaced by the study of the material social 
relationships that structures the reality (Escamilla Hernández, 1991). The law as an isolated 
system must be replaced by the critique of real relationships of property and possession 
(KELLEY, 1978). As Marx puts it,  
 
… truly philosophical critique does not consist, as Hegel thinks, in recognizing 
everywhere the determinations of the logical concept, but in conceiving the 
special logic of the special object (cited on ESCAMILLA HERNÁNDEZ, 1991: 
124). 
 
Even George Lukacs acknowledges that in young Marx’s work resides “a transition to 
materialism” henceforth his critique of the Hegelian state is historically grounded (1971: 
52).The historical materialistic study of law implies the study of the relationships between law 
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and the social-economic structure of the capitalist mode of production. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, the materialistic critique of law does not necessarily imply the search for a positive-
historical content of social from which would emanate the ultimate meaning of capitalist or 
bourgeois societies5. In other words, from a post-Marxist view the opposition between the form 
of the law and the economical content is not –necessarily- an opposition destined to be resolved. 
Neither the relationship between both elements is a linear and a transparent relation in which 
such and such legal rule responds simply to certain property relation. In the same vein, as will 
be outlined below, there is no clear or necessary resolution of that opposition in young Marx –
as there is in mature Marx.  
Therefore, the law itself does not belong necessarily to the field of the idea, rather than 
the metaphysics of law that is the expression par excellence of idealism. In a similar way that 
Enrique Dussel is positioned against naive materialism “that opposes matter with 
consciousness” (DUSSEL, 1993: 50), we can adopt a position that avoids the opposition 
between matter and law to consider the material into the law itself.. The materialism relies on 
the critical analysis of law that considers the materialistic grounds of the juridical. In this vein, 
Theodor Adorno´s thesis of the negative character of the Marxian dialectic simplifies a type of 
materialism that relies on “the redirection of the subject into the objectivity of both historical 
and natural objectivity, and the simultaneous impossibility of reducing the object to the pure 
self-production of the subject” (MARTÍN, 2013: 75). From a post-Marxian approach it is 
possible to conceive that the law –understood in a broad sense that does not reduce the juridical 
to the positive law and certain normative expressions- is not only an element of historical 
objectivity neither a mere invention of the subject. Far from that, a materialistic approach can 
help us to consider the law as a matter and consciousness phenome that belongs to both the 
objectivity and subjectivity fields at the same time. 
Second, far from an opposition between political critique and political involvement, the 
epistemological orientation in young Marx is premised on a necessary relationship between 
them. The critique of the “old world” is not isolated from the struggle to found the new one. 
Marx states in Letters to Ruge:  
 
Nothing prevents us from relating our criticism to the criticism of politics, or from 
participating in politics. Relating it to political struggles and identify them. We 
do not face the world in a doctrinal way, with a new principle: "Here is the truth, 
kneel!" We develop new principles from the very principles of the world. We do 
 
5 About it see: Foa Torres & Reynares, 2019. 
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not say "abandon your struggles, which are crazy". We want to shout the true 
motto of the fight (2008c: 90).  
 
This epistemological viewpoint does not imply a pragmatic-political reduction of 
Marx´s thought but rather an antidote for dogmatism or idealism through the explicit political 
involvement of the critical. In the Critique to Hegel´s philosophy of law, the critique addresses 
to “make the real oppression even further more oppressive, adding to it the awareness of 
oppression, and making the infamy more infamous by making it public” (2008d: 98). 
Oppressive social relationships are the orientation of the critique towards a radical theory that 
can become “material power when the masses take over” (2008d: 103). The sharp distinction 
between theory and strategy is rejected in favor of a necessary link between both.  
 
3. THE STUDY OF LAW AS A JURIDICAL FORM  
 
As Donald Kelly puts it, the early Marx´s rejection of the methodology of jurisprudence 
that separates form of law from content, rests on the necessity to “investigate first the material 
base” (1978: 356). Mainstream jurisprudence tends to study the law as an isolated object that 
has no structural links with social relationships. This being the case, then there is no possible 
“true philosophy” in the field of jurisprudence, but only a metaphysics that avoids the law´s 
material base. In what follows, the young Marx´s distinction between unreal generality and real 
individuality, celestial life and terrestrial life, will be addressed towards the identification of 
some key elements of a materialistic critique of law from a post-Marxist view. 
In “Comments on The Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction”6 (2008b [1843]), it is 
possible to identify the first steps towards Marx´s delimitation of the law as a juridical form. 
Marx claims a “liberalism of appearance” of the Prussian instruction since the “objective vices” 
of an institution (censorship) has been foisted to the individuals and not to its essential causes:  
 
This is the liberalism of appearance’s style, which allows some concessions, 
sacrificing the individuals, in other words the instruments, for the purpose of 
conserve the thing, the institution (...) Changing a person is believed to be a 
change of the thing. The look is not oriented to the censorship but to the individual 
censors (MARX, 2008: 55).  
 
 
6 This is the first journalistic article of Marx that reviews the so-called freedom of expression of the Prussian law. 
Written in 1842, the article was not published in Germany and appeared a year later in a compilation edited in 
Switzerland (JARAMILLO, 2008). 
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Consequently, a contradiction between the legal form and the legal content, the dialectic 
of the censorship instruction, demands that “we must trust in the censor; in spite of the 
deficiencies of the censorship” (200b: 68). We must respect the law and, at the same time, we 
must respect institutions that placed “the arbitrary in the place of the law” (2008b: 68). 
The next step, more theoretically relevant, refers to the critique of the German 
philosophy of law and state that “is the ideal extension of the German history” (2008d: 101). 
Young Marx draws in the distinction between the ideal conditions – the history “made with 
dreams” and the philosophical and abstract prolongation of the German law and state- and the 
real conditions of life of German people. In that sense, the purpose of critique could be to 
identify in what ways the illusions support a certain state of affairs. Religion or law could be 
seen as forms and not as ethical or moral contents of social relationships: “once the afterlife of 
truth has been dissipated, the mission of history consists in inquiring the truth of here and now. 
The mission of philosophy, at the service of history, consists in unmasking the profane forms 
of self-alienation once the sanctity form of human self-alienation has been unmasked. Critique 
of heaven becomes critique of the earth. Critique of religion becomes critique of law; critique 
of theology becomes critique of the political” (2008d: 96). The ideal conditions - build by 
speculative philosophy of law as the “abstract and exuberant thought of modern State” (2008d: 
102) - lead to the abstraction of the real man and his entirely imaginary satisfaction provided 
by modern state.  
Even though for Jean Hyppolite the opposition between the private individual and the 
citizen has a long history in Hegel´s work, the young Marx will radicalize this distinction. In 
“On The Jewish Question" the key contradiction of the political state is expressed in terms of 
“living a double-life” that lies on the opposition between the generic-celestial life and the 
material-terrestrial life, the “unreal generality” of bourgeois man and the “real individuality”. 
The religiosity of capitalist life relies on the way in which the modern state behaves with civil 
society: this behavior is as spiritual as “heaven with respect to the earth” (2008g: 180).Whereas 
in the modern state man is an “imaginary member of an imaginary sovereign”, in the civil-
bourgeois society man is a real selfish individual. For young Marx, this main contradiction or 
paradox of the capitalist mode of production could be removed.  In “Comments on the Latest…” 
Marx advocates for a “radical cure”7 for that contradiction and -as Escamilla Hernández puts 
 
7 “The radical cure of such censorship would be its suppression; because the institution is wrong, and the 
institutions are more powerful than men” (2008b: 78). 
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it- for a truly juridical unity of form and content: “where the consciousness expression of the 
will of the people is represented by law” (MARX, 1842, cited in ESCAMILLA HERNÁNDEZ, 
1991: 93).Likewise, in “Critique to Hegel´s philosophy of law” Marx addresses that the 
proletariat claims for the “dissolution of the existing universal order” because the proletariat 
itself “is the dissolution in fact of that universal order” (2008d: 109). Nevertheless, as Slavoj 
Zizek (2005) points out, one of the main orientations of Marx´s work is the analysis of 
mercantile form itself8. 
Two consequences or epistemological elements could be drawn at this point. First, the 
identification of the contradiction between unreal generality and real individuality does not 
refer to the nonexistence of that generality. In other words, a materialist critique of law does 
not imply the rejection of the analysis of the celestial or generality life in the capitalist mode of 
production but rather the study of its structural relationships with terrestrial or individual 
existence. Second, we focus on the analysis and critique of law as a juridical form rather than 
a utopian or essential content of the social. As Evgeni Pashukanis points out, the analysis of the 
juridical form allows conceiving the law “not as an attribute of human abstract society, but as 
a historical category that belongs to a social certain regime, build upon the opposition of private 
interests” (1976: 54). As detailed below, for young Marx human rights are not the rights of men 
but rather the rights of the individual member of the bourgeois society. 
Based on the oppositions between ideal conditions and real conditions, celestial life and 
terrestrial life, unreal generality and real individuality, Marx starts to draw the study of form as 
a method for a materialist critique of the capitalist mode of production. Mature Marx –in 
Capital- points out that even though the classic political economy approach to form of value 
had achieved the analysis of the value to expose its hidden content, “it never even raised the 
question about why that content adopts such form” (2008h: 98). The form work´s product value 
is an abstract and general form and “[i]f we get confused and take it for the eternal natural form 
of social production, we will also necessarily ignore what is specific to the form of value, and 
therefore in the mercantile form” (2008h: 99, note 32). 
Particularly, the critique of the juridical form permits an approach to law as historical 
and not the neutral appearance of social relationships. However, the study of the legal form can 
allow us to pay attention to the hidden content of the legal. As Zizek puts it “the properly 
 
8Zizek highlights the homology between the Freudian and Marxian interpretation method for the analysis of form 
(2005a). About it see: Foa Torres, 2013. 
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fetishistic fascination of the supposedly hidden content behind the form” (2005a: 35).This 
fascination might constitute the main obstacle for the development of a Marxist and materialist 
critique of law: once identified the juridical form, we may be tempted to account the different 
ways in which that appearance deforms or covers the real entity of social relationships. The 
main risk here is a possible drift of juridical critique to a functionalist study of law (FOA 
TORRES, 2013). Against this risk, focus could be on the entity and efficacy of the juridical 
appearance itself: “the form is never “mere” form but supposes its own dynamic that leaves 
traces in the materiality of social life” (ZIZEK, 2005b: 88). 
As Pietro Barcellona has proposed, to understand the life of contemporary men we must 
inquire “the way in which  human relationships can be represented as relationships between 
atomized individuals, that have no specific forms of social life and that have nothing in 
common” (1997: 39). Accordingly, the increasingly formalization of modern law as a “pure 
rule of play (…) indifferent to the materials contents of the justice” involves the appearance of 
law as an empty form. However, the law yet sanctions “the nomos of the market and of the 
economic calculation” (1997:39). Similarly, Jacques Ranciere (2004) notices that the dynamic 
of democracy relies on the gap between, on one hand, the abstract literality of rights, and on the 
other, the politicization of citizens around the polemic of right’s compliance. The juridical form 
is not seen neither as an essentialist-ahistorical content of the social nor as a simply product of 
historical-economical process. The juridical form could be seen, therefore, as a politicization 
space and not as a pre-political terrain. Finally, from a post-Marxist point of view there is no 
content of the juridical form that could fulfill it. The constitutive division of law drawn by Jodi 
Dean –taking from Zizek´s thought-relies on two constitutive or ontological lacks: of 
inconsistency –refered to the impossibility of law to be of fully systematized-  and of 
incompleteness–“involves the way that law is never grounded in truth”- (2004: 21). 
Furthermore, the law ultimately has no sense or as Todd McGowan puts it out, “Law´s 
fundamental prohibition is nonsensical because the primordial signifier, the signifier of the law 
as such, has no meaning” (2018: 54). In this line, the study of the juridical form may involve 
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4. STATE AND EMANCIPATION 
 
Jean Hyppolite has stated that Marx´s critique of Hegel´s philosophy of right is an “early 
Communist Manifesto” (1973: 106). In this sense, young Marx claims for a radical revolution–
based on “the fact that a determined class undertakes the general society emancipation starting 
from its special situation” (2008d: 106) - rather than a political or partial revolution –“the 
revolution that leaves intact the building foundations” (2008d: 105).For Hyppolite, the 
Hegelian contradiction between bourgeois society and State is possible to be surpassed by 
Marx´s critique: “The Hegelian dialectic still preserves the tension of conflict at the very core 
of the mediation; whereas Marx's real dialectic works for the complete suppression of that 
tension” (1973: 116). However, the radical revolution is only possible through the proletariat 
class: “The head of the emancipation is philosophy, its hearth the proletariat” (MARX, 2008d: 
109). 
The bourgeois State, in this context, is founded on an intrinsic contradiction: “the 
contradiction between public life and private life, (...) general interest and particular interests” 
(2008e: 123). This is why the State is impotent facing the bourgeois private law or, more 
specifically, the anti-social nature of bourgeois´ life: “If the modern state wanted to suppress 
the impotence of its administration, it would have to suppress current private life” (MARX, 
2008e: 123).  However, the paradox is that at as the state would suppress private bourgeois life, 
it would be suppressed itself: “because the State only exists in contrast with it [the private life]” 
(2008e: 124). Accordingly, from a state point of view it is only possible to note accidental and 
formal errors rather than structural social relationships of production and property. Bob Jessop 
points out that Marx agrees with Hegel in the separation between state and civil society. 
However, Marx “argues that this separation cannot be resolved neither through the rule of a 
universal and neutral bureaucracy nor through the election of a legislative assembly to govern 
in the interests of the people” (1978: 44). In contrast with Hegel, young Marx highlights that 
the distinction between state and civil society is a history fact and the second –civil society- 
determines the relationship between both (EIDELMAN, 2013). Accordingly, Marx concludes 
that the emancipation of man requires more than the concession of formal political freedom.  
Furthermore, in “On The Jewish Question”, Marx distinguishes between political 
emancipation and human emancipation. Against Bruno Bauer´s thesis of emancipation of the 
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modern state´s citizen from religion, Marx warns about the limitations of the political 
emancipation:  
 
… the fact that the state can be released from a limit without the man really getting 
rid of it (…) that State can be free State without man being a free man”(2008g: 
178). In spite of political emancipation, the religious remains the ideal 
consciousness of man: “the emancipation of state from religion is not the 
emancipation of the real man from religion (2008g: 187).  
 
Hereafter, young Marx analyses the function of juridical form in human alienation 
through the distinction between citizen rights and human rights of modern states. The first –
citizen rights- refer to the communitarian participation, that is to say, political rights –for 
instance freedom of speech, religious freedom and so on. The second –human rights- do not 
address a general or unhistorical man but the member of bourgeois society: “the selfish man, 
the man separated from men and community” (2008g: 190). In this sense, the main human right 
is not the right to freedom that is “the right to do and undertake everything that does not harm 
others”. Instead, the main human right is the one of property9, that is the unlimited right to enjoy 
and dispose of his patrimony “without attending to other men, independently from the society, 
the right of personal interest” (2008g: 191) .The real enforcement of freedom right is the right 
to property and the security right is no more than “the assurance of egoism”. In addition, the 
equality right refers to that “every man is considered equally like a monad that rests on itself” 
(2008 g: 191). 
Nonetheless, Humberto Schettino points out that young Marx adopts, at the same time, 
a negative conception of politics “as nothing but domination of one class over another and the 
State as the main resource of that domination” and a positive conception “that understands 
politics as community self-rule” (Schettino, 2004: 3). On their behalf, David Leopold notes that 
young Marx opposes not without reserves to politics and state, his theory of state and law in 
first writings “is more complex and original than most of the scholars suppose” (2012: 23). 
Although young Marx´s view –for according to Lepold- is opaque and fragmentary, he failed 
to “develop his own conception of human emancipation” (2012: 350). 
 
9As Marx pointed out in “Moralizing Criticism and Critical Morality”: “ private property is not a simple 
relationship and least of all an abstract concept, a principle, but it consists in the totality of  bourgeois production 
relationships -like all of bourgeois production relationships are class relationships-(…) the transformation or even 
abolition of this relations can only be possible henceforth a transformation of this classes and its reciprocal 
relationships, and the change of the relation between classes is a historical change, a product of the whole social 
activity; in one word, the product of a specific historical movement” (2008f: 165). 
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Despite these arguments, the aim at this point is to draw two theoretical-epistemic 
elements that tend to hinder the human-absolute emancipation, given a capitalist mode of 
production. The first element is the juridical institution of liberal individuality as an isolated 
monad. As mature Marx pointed out, “goods cannot go by themselves to the market or exchange 
themselves” (2008h: 103).To link that goods the relationship between persons is necessary, as 
they see each other as mere private properties: “the content of that juridical relationship (…) is 
given by the economic relationship itself” 2008h: 103). Evgeny Pashukanis stresses that the 
relationships between men in the production process implies the appearance, on one hand, of 
“relationships between things (goods)” and, on the other, the “relations of will between units 
who are independent from one another, equal to each other: as relations between legal subjects” 
(1976: 114). 
The real man of the human rights is the isolated monad –the selfish individual- rather 
than the abstract man of the citizen rights. Furthermore, this individual form is the premise of 
the bourgeois state and society. Pietro Barcellona has drawn attention to the “production 
process of social individuals” in the sense that “society is not only the organization of the 
conditions of reproduction of life (...) but fundamentally the creation of social individuals (...) 
learning what is common to all and what concerns exclusively individuals” (1997: 46). Todd 
McGowan states states that the paradox of our age remains on the belief of contemporary 
individual on his own increasingly autonomy or freedom whereas his submission or compliance 
is more forceful: “the society of enjoyment works to convince subjects that they exist outside 
this society, in independent isolation” (2004: 193). In this sense, the scope of the isolated monad 
has been deepened in the contemporary to an imaginary and narcissistic path where –
paradoxically- the individual tends to experience itself as historically the most autonomous and 
radical.  
Second, another obstacle for emancipation inside the capitalist mode of production 
resides on the intimate link –that characterizes the “living a double-life” of the liberal 
individual- between bourgeois law and its transgression. The simultaneously celestial and 
terrestrial life –as a political communitarian citizen and isolated egoistic monad- denotes that 
the juridical form does not merely distort or hide the capitalist production social relationships 
but rather allows its systematic transgression (FOA TORRES, 2013). For instance, the 
distinction -highlighted by Etienne Balibar (2006) -among property rights and property type of 
capitalist mode of production implies that while the appearance of a generalization of property 
Quaestio Iuris 
vol. 13, nº. 02, Rio de Janeiro, 2020. pp. 572 -591 







__________________________________________________vol.13, nº. 02, Rio de Janeiro, 2020. pp. 572-591        587 
 
is affirmed by the juridical form, the real production relationships are structured by an–
increasingly- unequal access to the property of the means of production. That is why “the type 
of capitalist property acquires such an appearance, not because it has hidden the relations 
between bourgeois and proletarians, but because of its enabling systematic transgression 
through obscenely institutionalized mechanisms of exclusion of groups or social classes” (FOA 
TORRES, 2013: 160). However, from a post-Marxist and Lacanian approach it is possible to -
as Jason Glynos pointed out- addresses the co-constitutivity of juridical form and transgression: 
“where there is self-transgressive enjoyment, then this is always experienced related to a 
particular ideal” (2008: 694). This contrasts with humanists and rationalists approaches that 
suppose a subject of self-control and self-knowledge and allow the study of the relationship 




The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce some epistemological and theoretical 
elements of young Marx that can avoid the trend of juridical field that reduces the Marxian 
approach to law to a simple political-pragmatic one11. In contrast, young Marx’s writings are a 
systematic approach and a critique to ideology through jurisprudence and juridical form, which 
draw some paths for human emancipation (KELLEY, 1978).Furthermore, this chapter has 
attempted to argue that young Marx is yet useful to build a critical approach to contemporary 
law and State. In the first place, based on the early Marxian critique of German jurisprudence 
and philosophy -the dogmatism and idealism of the “metaphysics of law”- it was possible to 
point out some elements for a materialist critique of law. Among them, the necessary 
involvement -even in first Marx´s writings- of the philosopher in the paths of human 
emancipation and even in the socialist strategy, was presented. Secondly, the bourgeois 
oppositions -identified by young Marx- between ideal conditions and real conditions, celestial 
life and terrestrial life, unreal generality and real individuality give rise to the analysis of law 
as a juridical form rather than a utopian or essential content of the social.  
 
10 For more details on this topic see, among others: ZIZEK, 2005a; DEAN, 2004; GLYNOS, 2008; FOA TORRES, 
2013. 
11For instance, Rubén Jaramillo has identified the Kelsen´s view of Marxian theory as a political pragmatic 
reduction –most specifically in “Communist theory of law and state” (1957) - . 
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Furthermore, it was argued that there is no necessary link between the juridical form 
and economic-social content, at least from a post-Marxist viewpoint. Even the possibility of 
thinking law as a form, with ultimately, no sense, was raised. Thirdly, both the young-Marxian 
distinction between the political emancipation and human emancipation and the role of the state 
in the reproduction of the capitalist social relationships, enable us to draw at least two main 
obstacles for emancipation given a capitalist mode of production. On the one hand, the juridical 
institution of the liberal individual as isolated monads that tend to an increasingly narcissistic 
and unhistorical individual. On the other, the intimate relationship between juridical form and 
its transgression that structures the dynamics of bourgeois law. Finally, it should be noted that 
young Marx's writings on law and state could be a relevant input, especially in this phase of 
capitalism in which the rule of law itself is threatened. As Pietro Barcellona has pointed out, a 
possible way of the Marxian critique of law is to prevent "democracy from being deprived of 
form (non representable) and the form from becoming totally indifferent to the contents (pure 
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